PhD researcher, University of Antwerp
Research interests: Jo's research interests are about the intersection of moral responsibility and psychopathology. A by now traditional approach tries to define how a specific psychopathology incapacitates, at least in a specific field, moral responsibility of the so afflicted. Whilst such exculpation gives a number of benefits it also sets people apart as (in many cases neurologically) abnormal. This creates a Catch-22 because to get access to exculpation one needs to admit to some level of abnormality. In Strawson's terms: one is regarded by others in the objective stance and this is profoundly incompatible with normal interpersonal relations. As it seems such mixed blessing, or double-edged sword, is indeed borne out by empirical research in social psychology, we're confronted with the question whether more nuanced accounts are possible. An answer to this question requires simultaneously looking into our accountability practices and the biologically and neurologically dynamic basis of psychopathology as compatible with free will. Jo studies specifically the cases of Tourette Syndrome and autism.
Professor of practical philosophy, Stockholm University
Research interests: My main areas of interest are moral responsibility, metaethics, and moral psychology. Most of my work on moral responsibility has developed unified accounts of responsibility and attributions of responsibility, with a particular interest in moral responsibility skepticism and the responsibility of groups and organizations. The guiding idea has been to start with an empirically adequate account of why attributions of responsibility display the patterns they do. Such an account can then help us understand why people are prone to skepticism when considering the possibility of determinism or external causes of actions. It can also help us understand why people are tempted to attribute shared moral responsibility to groups while being worried that lack of individual control undermines responsibility. Based on the understanding offered by the account, we are then better placed to determine the correctness of compatibilist and incompatibilist intuitions and attributions of moral responsibility to groups. Other work of mine has focused on the nature of moral judgment and its relation to moral motivation, and on the nature and semantic significance of disagreement in morals and elsewhere.
Senior researcher in Practical Philosophy, University of Gothenburg
Research: I am interested in the philosophy of action, broadly conceived, as well as the philosophy of psychology/cognitive science and social ontology. With respect to moral responsibility, my research has focused on the relation between shared/collective action and shared/collective moral responsibility and obligations. Issues that I am currently thinking about: the analogy between coordination of complex action over time and coordination of complex action between several agents, “attributionism” about moral responsibility applied to individual and collective moral responsibility, and how quality of will is related to intentions.
Postdoctoral researcher associated with the Chair of Philosophy of Mind, at the LMU. Senior researcher (RTD-b, tenure track) at Roma Tre University.
Sofia specialises in philosophy of mind/action, philosophy of cognitive neuroscience, and moral psychology. Her current research interests focus on the philosophy of volition, action and responsibility (in particular: epistemic and control conditions of responsibility, scepticism on responsibility, backward and forward-looking views of responsibility, moral luck, akrasia and responsibility). Before joining the LMU, she has been a postdoctoral researcher at the Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, UCL (Action and Body Group) and at the School of Advanced Study (UoL), working on theoretical aspects of volition, intentions, and responsibility, and carrying out experimental work on the cognitive neuroscience of actions and intentions.
Professor of Philosophy of Behaviour Science and Academic leader of the Radboud Teaching and Learning Centre.
Research interests: Philosophy of Education, Philosophy of Psychology, Replication crisis, neo-pragmatism, Explanation and understanding, Science communication, Epistemic responsibility, Philosophy of Love, Philosophy of Common Sense, Dramaturgical model of human action, Ambiguity of motivation, Epistemic injustice, Reasons and causes. As regards responsibility my main interest at the moment is in questions concerning shared epistemic responsibility among experts and laypeople, and in particular with respect to educational innovation.
Professor of Philosophy, University of St Andrews.
Research interests:Epistemology, responsibility, blame for belief, epistemic responsibility, group responsibility, profiling beliefs.
Professor in Practical Philosophy, University of Gothenburg
Research interests: Shared responsibility for collective harms, e.g. global warming and climate change.
(Associate professor, the Inland University of Applied Sciences/Associate professor II at ConceptLab, Univeristy of Oslo)
Research interests: I mostly work on foundational questions in the philosophy of responsibility. An agent S is blameworthy for X to the extent it is appropriate to blame S for X. I’m interested in the nature of blame, and in particular in self-blame, including the intrinsically painful emotions of shame and guilt. I’m also interested in how to understand the relevant notion of appropriateness, in particular the difference between fittingness and desert. Lately I have been working on issues concerning blameworthiness over time, and whether standard accounts of blameworthiness can make sense of how experiences of guilt, apologies and forgiveness influence one’s degree of blameworthiness. I’m also working on the metaethics of responsibility, including questions concerning whether moral responsibility should be understood as a response-dependent or response- independent concept.
Visiting Research Fellow King's College London
Research interests: I work at the junction of the philosophy of action, normative ethics, and epistemology, especially on questions related to free will and responsibility. Amongst other things, I am interested in free will scepticism and responses to it. My thesis was on different accusations launched against the free will sceptic, such as not being up to the moral life, doubting in the wrong context, endorsing a self-defeating doctrine, or being an irrational deliberator. I think that the sceptic is up to the challenge, but at a theoretical cost. The flipside of my interest in scepticism is my interest for what we can know about responsibility and whether we can be dogmatic about this. What can we say about a 'Moorean' response to those who deny the existence of moral responsibility or who claim that, at any rate, we cannot know that we are responsible? In continuation with my thesis, I am also exploring the different requirements of rational deliberation.
Adjunct Professor, Università degli Studi di Padova
Research interests: My primary research interest is in the domain of free will and moral responsibility. I am currently engaged in the attempt to develop a form of compatibilism that recovers some of the insight of traditional moral influence theories while escaping their flaws.
Further interests are Wittgenstein, the philosophical methodology, and the philosophy of science.
Professor,University of Leuven
Research interests: Free will and moral responsibility / legal liability, especially in connection to PF Strawson and HLA Hart.
Mario De Caro
Full professor at Università Roma Tre (Italy) and regularly a Visiting Professor at Tufts University
Research interests: Free will, moral responsibility, legal responsibility, theory of punishment, history of the free will conceptions.
Benjamin De Mesel
Postdoctoral researcher, Institute of Philosophy, KU
Research interests: I am interested in philosophical methodology and in what is sometimes called Oxford linguistic philosophy (Wittgenstein, P.F. Strawson, Ryle, Austin, etc.). I wrote my dissertation about the possibility of applying Wittgenstein’s philosophical methodology to problems in moral philosophy (see my book, The Later Wittgenstein and Moral Philosophy, Springer 2018; see also Benjamin De Mesel and Oskari Kuusela (eds.), Ethics in the Wake of Wittgenstein, Routledge 2019). In my postdoctoral work, I have been developing a reading of Strawson’s ‘Freedom and Resentment’ that takes Wittgenstein’s influence and the rest of Strawson’s oeuvre into account. Recent publications include ‘The Facts and Practices of Moral Responsibility’ (with Sybren Heyndels), Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2019), 790-811; ‘On Shoemaker’s Response-Dependent Theory of Responsibility’ (with Sybren Heyndels), Dialectica 72 (2018), 445-451; ‘Are Our Moral Responsibility Practices Justified? Wittgenstein, Strawson and Justification in ‘Freedom and Resentment’’, British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (2018), 603-614; ‘Moral Responsibility and the Moral Community. Another Reply to Zimmerman’, The Journal of Ethics 22 (2018), 77-92; ‘Is Moral Responsibility Essentially Interpersonal? A Reply to Zimmerman’, The Journal of Ethics 21 (2017), 309-333. In future work, I hope to explore issues concerning blame, the moral emotions and punishment.
Ezio Di Nucci
Professor of Bioethics and Director of the Centre for Medical Science and Technology Studies at the University of Copenhagen
Research interests: Have done a lot of work in action theory and free will in the ´00s, especially the intentionality of automatic actions and Frankfurt-style cases, respectively.
Stipendiary lecturer in philosophy, University of Oxford, Lady Margaret Hall.
Research Interests: Free will, agency, and moral responsibility. More specifically: The role of alternative possibilities in supporting moral responsibility, including questions about the correct analysis of the ability to do otherwise, the moral significance of the ability to do otherwise, and Frankfurt-style counterexamples to PAP, the prospects of emergent theories of libertarian freedom (i.e. theories that posit indeterminism at the agency level consistent with determinism at a physical level), luck objections to incompatibilism and the question of whether free will can be reconciled with indeterminism, including disappearing agent arguments and arguments that rest on a demand for contrastive explanations, the question of whether determinism is consistent with moral obligations and prohibitions, including transcendental arguments for free will and arguments for scepticism about deontic morality, the implications of determinism for moral deliberation, the practical implications of free will scepticism, both for practical moral agency and for our desert-entailing practices, the implications of empirical research for free will, the practical bearing of neuroscientific evidence on legal responsibility.
Ph.D. Student with LGRP
Research interest: My research interests largely consist of issues pertaining to agency and responsibility and their relation to luck and fate. My main area is free will, and especially compatibilist theories and their respective relation to naturalistic explanations, determinism and moral luck. I have a special interest for the manipulation argument against compatibilism, having directed my Master’s thesis to it, and continuing with the problem in part in my dissertation. Also, shared responsibility, the interaction of agents and its implications for responsibility, is of interest. I think that there is underdeveloped ground when it comes to the connection between moral luck, shared responsibility, and other social aspects of responsible agency, such as discussions concerning norms and conventions, and social identity. A research subject in this area I aim to enquire more about is the suggestion that agents, when they are not responsible, may take responsibility for some outcome as their action; that this would be instances of ambiguous agency, or cases at the penumbra of responsible agency.
In addition, action theory, collectivity and collective responsibility obviously interest me. Personal identity, social ontology, and political philosophy are as well of interest, especially in the respects that these issues interact with those of responsibility.
Doctoral student within Lund Gothenburg Responsibility Project, University of Gothenburg
Research interests: I am particularly interested in philosophy of self as well as the intersection between personal perspective, identity and responsibility. My research within LGRP focuses on degrees of responsibility, and roughly, whether one––over time––remains the same person as the performer of one’s past actions, and, owns such actions in the same way one once did. At the moment, what strikes me the most is how a reductionist account in identity could best fit into the framework of personal values and perspectives on the one hand, and, responsibility and ownership of actions on the other.
ERC Research Fellow, Roots of Responsibility, UCL, Department of Philosophy.
Research Interests: I have interests in ethics, epistemology, and normativity. At the moment, I am particularly interested in the conditions under which moral mistakes and ignorance excuse, the relationship between epistemic capacities and blameworthiness, and moral recklessness and negligence. I am also interested in symmetries and asymmetries between distinct normative domains.
Associate Professor, University of Copenhagen
Research interests: My research is focused on a number of issues in philosophy of action (mind), philosophy of psychology, and philosophy of science. One question that interests me is how the types of control philosophers think are necessary for moral responsibility compares to types of cognitive control modelled by cognitive psychologists.
Assistant Professor, University of Navarra
Research interests: I am working especially on the epistemology of free will, more precisely on the question whether a libertarian conception of free will can meet the "integration challenge", i.e. provide an adequate epistemology. I defend an introspectionist epistemology of (libertarian) free will. I am also interested in other theories of the knowledge of free will, including transcendental arguments for free will.
Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Stockholm University
Research interests: Free will, moral responsibility, moral luck, luck, character, self-creation, situationism, nudging, implicit bias, praise and blame, forgiveness, and free will in philosophical theology including the afterlife.
Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, University of Copenhagen
Research interests: My main research is on moral theory, in particular the nature and normativity of obligations, but I also work on the relations of moral theory to theories of practical reasoning and moral psychology. With respect to the latter, I mainly work on so-called ‘quality of will’ approaches to attitudes like blame, trust, care, and respect.
Research professor, University of Antwerp
Research interests: Kristien Hens is a research professor at University of Antwerp, and a guest professor at KU Leuven. Her main interest is how concepts of biology influence how we think about normative issues in somatic medicine and psychiatry. She investigates how evolving ideas about genetics and development may influence ethical questions. In this respect, she is currently focusing on two areas, epigenetics and neurodevelopmental disorders. With regards to epigenetics she investigates how epigenetic findings may influence how we conceive of moral responsibility, and the balance between individual, parental and collective responsibility, and how epigenetic interpretations of medical conditions may challenge traditional assumptions in bioethics. With regards to developmental disorders (autism/ADHD/ Tourette syndrome), she investigates how lived experiences can and should be part of any endeavor to understand these disorders.
Professor of Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy, University of Groningen
Research interests: Frank Hindriks is interested in moral responsibility at the individual, collective and corporate level:
- At the individual level, he explores the role that the notion of intentional action plays in the attribution of moral responsibility. He also investigates how people rationalize immoral behavior so as to try to escape moral responsibility.
- At the collective level, he focuses on responsibility for collective harms (e.g. climate change) and structural injustices (e.g. gender discrimination). And he asks what the moral significance is of a lack of willingness to help solve such collective action problems.
- At the corporate level, Hindriks is concerned with what it takes for an organized collective to be a moral agent and with whether and how a collective agent should facilitate the distribution of responsibility to its members.
Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellow, University of Helsinki
Research interests: My research focuses on shared and collective responsibility. This includes questions such as what collectively caused structural harms we can be complicit in, what the nature of collective agents, and what we mean by their responsibility. I am also interested in questions to do with social epistemology and responsibility, especially in relation to collective agents. Examples include mechanisms that can cause institutional ignorance, or the use of agnotology tactics (deliberately spreading misinformation) to delay collective action to address climate change.
I defended my thesis on individual and collective responsibility for climate change in December 2017. I was awarded the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Global Fellowship in 2019 for my research project ‘Complicity: Individual Responsibility in Collective Contexts’. The two-year project sets out to explain how and in what ways individuals can be held responsible for collectively caused systemic harms, and when should we hold a collective responsible instead. More information about my research can be found at shormio.wordpress.com
Professor of Philosophy, Central European University
Research interests: My main areas of research include philosophy of action, free will, rationality and philosophical psychology. I am also interested in metaphysical problems related to these topics such as the notion of abilities, dispositions, laws, teleology as well the concept of life. In my former works I argued that we need to distinguish several different notions of determinism, neither of which entails the others and only one of which – physical determinism – is compatible with free will. I defend a version of the conditional analysis of freedom and, more generally, the thesis that modal properties like abilities and powers should be interpreted as grounding possibilities rather than, as the Humean tradition has it, necessities. In philosophy of action, I argue for a teleological account of intentional action which explains the possibility of rational control in terms of agents’ seeing themselves as responding to options rather than in terms of the causal origin of actions. Finally, I am also interested in the history of theproblem of rationality and freedom, especially in the philosophy of Hume, Kant and Hegel.
Grote Professor of Philosophy, UCL; PI, Roots of Responsibility
Research interests: My main research interests are in epistemology and metaphysics, philosophy of mind and action, philosophy of art, and the philosophy of Wittgenstein. In 2018, I began a five-year research project entitled Roots of Responsibility, supported by an ERC Advanced Grant. The project draws on legal theory, which contains a rich literature on the relationships between responsibility, liability and culpability; biological systems theory, which has shown how the activity of more complex systems can harness stochasticity in the activity of the less complex systems of which they are composed; and the philosophy of action, where the different dimensions of human behaviour are now more clearly articulated and better understood.
Doctoral Student, LGRP
I work on conceptual and normative questions about blame. The first part of my thesis consists of a discussion about the nature of blame. It investigates judgment accounts, emotion accounts and speech acts accounts of blame. The second part, which I have not started writing yet, will consist of a discussion about blameworthiness and other fittingness conditions. More specifically, about when it is fitting to blame and to perform an act of blaming. In addition to these conceptual and normative questions, I work on the question about standing to blame and am interested in Huckleberry Finn cases. Further, I am interested in and work on Fitting Attitude Accounts of Blame, which states that for an agent to be blameworthy is for it to be the case that there are reasons to blame her.
Postdoctoral Researcher, University of Jyväskylä
Research interests: My post doc research project "Limits of Moral Responsibility" studies the concept of moral responsibility in general, including the key themes of nature and limits of moral responsibility, agency, blame, character and excuses.
My main theoretical approaches are anglophone ethics (broadly understood) and history of philosophy. I have used Strawsonian accounts of moral responsibility as a starting point and I have also compared the current theories with interpretations of Aristotle's account of responsibility in action and character. I am currently interested in the recent discussions on elements of responsibility, blame and moral character.
Associate Professor, University of Oxford
Research interests: I am interested in the ways in which responsibility for actions and outcomes can come in degrees. Related to this project I have worked on the metaphysics of causation and free will, liability in tort and criminal law, and responsibility in war.
Extraordinary Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy, University of Oxford. ERC Research Fellow (Roots of Responsibility).
Research interests: My PhD (2019) focused on the conditions of voluntary consent, in particular in the medical context. I employed the concept of interpersonal justification to separate those influences on a person's decision-making that vitiate their consent from those that do not. In my current role as a post-doc, I explore parallels between consent and responsibility, discuss the metaphysical presuppositions of liability and responsibility, and aim to develop voluntariness as a key concept in moral philosophy, a concept to be distinguished from intentionality, freedom, free will, autonomy, and willingness. Moreover, I am also interested in questions about consent and responsibility in the context of artificial intelligence.
Assistant Professor, University of Warsaw
Research interests: action and agency (intention, intentionality, reasons for action, responsibility, theories of the agent, shared agency, partiality) and moral psychology (shame and guilt, hope, confidence, regret, forgiveness).
Senior Lecturer, Edinburgh University
I am interested in compatibilist accounts of moral responsiblity, what they hope to achieve and how they work, as well as the connection between accounts of moral responsibility and normative concepts, such as rightness and wrongess. I am also interested in the cluster of ideas associated with responsibility theory: blame, guilt, remorse, shame, apology, and so on.
Researcher at the University of Gothenburg
Research interests: I'm currently working on a project called called "The Limits of Forgiveness," funded by the Swedish Research Council. I study moral responsibility and the factors that make us more or less responsible. My focus is how we hold ourselves and others responsible by blaming, apologising, and forgiving. I also study the responsibilities of engineers and other professionals and investigate how technologies, public policies, and social conditions shape their responsibilities.
Position: PhD researcher, University of Antwerp
Research interests: Emma Moormann is a doctoral researcher interested in the complex relationship between individual and collective moral responsibility. Her main focus is on forward-looking collective responsibility and its potential to serve as a call for action. She aims to contribute to a cross-fertilization of more theoretical debates on these matters on the one hand and discussions of responsibility for individual health on the other. How should we distribute responsibilities for health in our complex societies? And how can we employ findings in epigenetics and knowledge about neurodevelopmental disorders to inform deliberations of what counts as a fair distribution? Emma studies the literature on the possibility and desirability of collective responsibility and collective agency, shared responsibility, and group agents. Additionally, she draws inspiration from a varied range of research fields, including anarchist political philosophy and philosophy of education.
Professor, University of Valencia
Research interests: My research interests include very especially topics related to moral responsibility and free will; my own position is libertarian; but I'm also interested in wider issues in the philosophy of action and the philosophy of mind.
Professor of practical philosophy, University of Gothenburg
Research interests: Applied ethical and conceptual issues related to moral and legal agency and responsibility, especially related to science and technology innovation (e.g. AI and potentially very risky technology), healthcare and policy (responsibility allocation between professionals and patients, family members, boundaries of professional responsibility), and individual features of agents (eg. related to hate crime or forensic psychiatry). Basic moral philosophy regarding the ethical evaluation of uncertain and/or risky decisions, especially regarding the notion of precaution.
University of Amsterdam
Research interests :The main focus of my research is autonomy theory, both in moral and political philosophy. This branches out in (1) an historical interest (e.g., Kant, Mill, Berlin), (2) a theoretical aspect (e.g., Harry Frankfurt's theory, concepts of manipulation, the normative impossibility of hard determinism) and (3) an applied strand (e.g., the ethics of nudging, public health ethics, respect for autonomy and justified paternalism). Apart from this, I have written on open voting, toleration, and evil.
University Researcher, University of Helsinki
Research interests: Core issues in the philosophy of action and agency: the nature of intentional action, philosophical psychology of rational practical agency, action explanation, intention, shared intention, reasons, answerability, moral responsibility, commitment. Philosophy of mind: causal and explanatory exclusion, first-person perspective.
Deputy Director, Roots of Responsibility (ERC advanced grant project); Departmental instructor, Department of Philosophy, UCL; Non-stipendiary lecturer, St Benet's Hall, University of Oxford
Research interests: My research interests stretch across several fields within philosophy, constituting what can be loosely called ‘philosophical anthropology’: philosophy of action, philosophical psychology, metaethics, philosophy of language and philosophy of art. I work on problems involving action, intention, reasons, reasoning, rationality, objectivity, normativity and practice, as they arise in these and other areas, drawing on a wide range of philosophers including Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant, Wittgenstein, Anscombe and Bernard Williams.
Atle Ottesen Søvik
Professor of Systematic Theology, MF Norwegian School of Theology
Research interests: AI-technology, ethics and anthropology, in particular the question of robots and responsibility.
Postdoctoral Fellow, University of Zurich
Research interests: My two main research areas are reparations and criminal justice ethics. In these areas, state responsibility and the responsibility of collectives and corporate agents are recurring themes. (I write about the nature of the state’s responsibility for forms of state-sponsored injustice and official wrongdoing as well as distributing the state’s moral and financial responsibilities to citizen-taxpayers.) Accountability is also a central theme of my work; in a few months, I am submitting the full version of my manuscript Reparations and State Accountability (advance contract, University of Chicago Press) for peer review. My work also brings in literatures on apology and forgiveness; blame; moral responsibility and professional role ethics; and criminal responsibility and punishment. I am a co-organizer of the Zurich Moral Responsibility Speaker Series along with Philipp Schwind, Stefan Riedener, and Friedemann Bieber.
Emeritus Professor, Distinguished Research Fellow, Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics
Research interests: see my books The Retreat of Reason (OUP, 2005), From Morality to the End of Reason (OUP, 2013), Inclusive Ethics (OUP, 2017) and Reasons in Actions (OUP, 2019).
Professor of Philosophy, King’s College London
Research interests: Ethics, Political and Legal Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics, History of Philosophy.
Junior Research Fellow at Wolfson College and Member of the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Oxford.
Research interests: I work on the practical origins of our practices of responsibility attribution in both the moral and the legal sphere, with a particular focus on blame and voluntariness. Drawing on the work of Bernard Williams, I seek to understand how the most generic forms of our ideas of responsibility, blame, and voluntariness relate to the particular refinement of them that Williams criticises under the heading of “the morality system,” and how we can reconcile the thought that these are functional ideas rooted in practical needs with the non-instrumental perspective these ideas themselves invite us to take up. I address these issues using the pragmatic genealogical method I develop in my book The Practical Origins of Ideas: Genealogy as Conceptual Reverse-Engineering (OUP 2020).
Assistant Professor, Eötvös Lorand University, Budapest
Research interests: moral responsibility, compatibilism, attributionism, control, blame.
Professor of Practical Philosophy, Lund University & Director of the Lund-Gothenburg Responsibility Project
Research: My interests cover the areas of free will and moral responsibility along with various topics in early modern philosophy. Within the area of free will and moral responsibility I am particularly interested in the challenge of scepticism and theories of responsibility that appeal to reactive attitudes or moral sentiments.
Recent Publications: "Limits of Free Will: Selected Essays" (Oxford University Press: 2017).*
Projects/Affiliations: Lund-Gothenburg Responsibility Project: https://www.lgrp.lu.se/
Senior Lecturer, Department of General Psychology, University of Padova,
Research interests: I am a researcher and a consultant forensic psychologist. As such, I am particularly intersted in finding a bridge between psychological research and law. I am particularly interested in how neuro-scientific techniques can improve the reliability of insanity evaluation. I have now started a project to create a shared definition of free will that can be useful for insanity evalutation. Furthermore, I am studying the difference between acquired and developmental pedophilia. in the basis research, I am interested in the study of emotions conveyed by faces.
Senior lecturer Dept of Philosophy University of Antwerp
Research interests: My main research line is on the moral significance of love and care, but I have long-standing and relatively recent interests in topics related to responsibility, namely: responsibility for believing something (moral encroachment), responsibility for not believing something or someone (epistemic injustice and virtue epistemology), objective and reactive attitudes in applied contexts like feminist thinking (Kate Manne) and disability studies (I am especially troubled by what is being said about so-called moral deficiencies in autistic individuals), responsibility and reason-responsiveness (applied to controversial cases like implicit bias and love).
Postdoc, Center for Ethics, University of Zurich
Research interests: My research centers around the problem of moral luck and related issues, in particular on the control principle. I am also working on papers that discuss ommissions and negligence.
Full Professor Philosophy of Moral Agency, University of Tilburg
Primary interests: philosophy of action, moral psychology, meta-ethics. Issues worked on: free will, moral responsibility, developments in the behavioural, cognitive and neurosciences (BCN-sciences) that allegedly show that much of what we do escapes our awareness. I have addressed these developments, because, and in as far as, I think they are relevant to philosophical reflection. In the past years I have written about the empirical literature on implicit biases and the philosophical discussion on our moral responsibility for implicit biases, moral hypocrisy, love as the biological platform for morality. I have also articulated a view on human moral agency that I refer to as a “traffic participation view” (TPV). That view is not particularly new/original, but its articulation is helpful in explaining why developments in the BCN-sciences referred to above are of interest and how to interpret them. The TPV understands our capacities as human agents to be developed primarily through our participation in shared human practices. This process starts at a very early age, long before we are capable of relating to others and ourselves through deliberation and language. I believe the moral sentiments —the human responses with reactive emotions such as resentment, blame, indignation, gratitude, praise and admiration—play an important role in this process, at least in our Western world. One of the reasons why I like “traffic-participation” as a metaphor is that it captures the importance of fluent interactions for navigating our way through the world, while it at the same time allows us to understand why interruptions to it tend to attract more attention when reflecting on ourselves.
Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Haifa
I work primarily on normative and applied ethics, the free will problem, and the meaning of life. On free will my main efforts have been, first, to open up the debate on the compatibility question to a dualistic or pluralistic approach that sees both compatibilism and hard determinism (or other forms of free will and moral responsibility denialism) as partly valid and seeks to integrate them. Second, to explore Illusionism, the view that illusion is central and, in many ways, positive in the free will problem. I am particularly interested in the relationship of free will with justice (criminal and economic), in the moral psychology of free will, and in the possibility of changing our beliefs, reactions and practices concerning free will and moral responsibility.
PhD Fellow, University of Copenhagen
Research interests: My research is situated on the philosophy of free will and moral responsibility. My PhD project focuses on probabilistic models of free will and integrates insights from philosophy of mind and action, cognitive neuroscience and psychology. I am interested in the implications such models have for theories of moral responsibility, namely issues of control, luck and indetermination. Ultimately, my research explores the possibility of an empirically grounded account of free will and moral responsibility that is compatible with a probabilistic universe. I am also a member of the Copenhagen Cognition, Intention & Action Group (CoInAct), an interdisciplinary research group that engages in experimental and theoretical research within cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology and philosophy of mind and action.
Professor of Philosophy of Mind and Action, University of Leeds
I'm especially interested in metaphysical issues which relate to the question of moral responsibility, including problems having to do with determinism, free will, human exceptionalism, the ontology of action and omission, events and processes, etc. In particular, I've argued for a view I call 'agency incompatibilism' which holds that agency, in and of itself, is incompatible with determinism, and that the distinction between freely-willed actions and the rest should be discarded. This view implies (on the assumption, which I accept, that at least some non-human animals can act) that determinism is incompatible with the conditions of large swathes of animal (and not just of human) life. I'm also interested in whether alternative ontologies (e.g. processual ontologies, rather than event-based thinking; powers-based rather than event-based conceptions of causation) might improve our chances of getting the metaphysics of action right.
PhD in theoretical philosophy, University of Gothenburg
Research interests: My dissertation concerns the metaphysics of desert, especially the metaphysical basis of desert-based responsibility, blame and punishment. I am currently applying for funding for a project in which I want to develop a more detailed analysis of the nature of mental causation and the role it, explicitly or implicitly, plays for compatibilist free will and desert-based responsibility.
Besides these questions, I am interested in the relation between collective and individual responsibility from a theoretical perspective (as for example, there seem to be some fundamental differences between collective and individual responsibility with regard to e.g., identity-restrictions: it is commonly thought that personal identity is required for being personally responsible for an action, but the identity requirements for collective responsibility seem to be quite different).
PhD student, University of Helsinki
Research interests: My main research interests are moral and epistemic responsibility, moral and epistemic agency and the parities and disparities between different types of responsibility, agency, and norms. I look at these issues through philosophical questions that feature the interplay of various different norms, such as culpability for normative and non-normative ignorance, culpability for actions influenced by implicit bias, prejudice, and nudging, as well as praise- and blameworthiness for actions based on moral deference and testimony from others, and the problem of ethical expertise. I’m also interested in questions concerning practical and moral encroachment on the rationality of belief and epistemic justification in general. More widely, I’m interested in questions at the intersection of meta-ethics, epistemology (both moral and non-moral), moral psychology, and philosophy of mind.
Senior Lecturer in Practical Philosophy at Linköping University and Associate Director and Research Fellow of the Lund Gothenburg Responsibility Project.
He serves as an associate editor of the journal Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. He specialises in action theory, emotion theory and the ethics and metaphysics of individual and collective responsibility.
Senior Researcher in Practical Philosophy, LGRP
Research: My research focuses on the psychological, epistemic, and social conditions of moral responsibility and blameworthiness. A general contention that emerges in my work is that theorists often place unnecessary restrictions on moral responsibility. For example, many philosophers believe that only morally competent wrongdoers, and those with certain sorts of personal histories, are open to moral blame. I maintain, however, that what matters for moral responsibility is whether an agent’s behavior expresses certain inter-personally significant attitudes toward those affected by her behavior. And I argue that an agent’s behavior can have this expressive significance even if she cannot recognize the moral status of her behavior and even if she played only a passive role in acquiring the values and dispositions that inform her behavior.
Lecturer, The University of Edinburgh
Research Interests; In the metaphysics of free will: the fixity of the past, fatalism, future contingents and the open future, omniscience and free will, time and freedom. In addition, I am interested in the traditional contours of the compatibility debate, e.g. determinism, laws of nature, and the consequence argument. I am also especially interested in manipulation arguments for incompatibilism. In moral responsibility theory: I am interested in broadly "Strawsonian" arguments for compatibilism, and questions about the "justification" of our practices of moral responsibility. I am also pursuing several projects on the "ethics of blame", especially on the moral standing to blame.
Caroline Torpe Touborg
Postdoctoral research fellow, Lund Gothenburg Responsibility Project, Lund University
Research interests: I am interested in causation, responsibility, and moral norms – what they are, and how they relate to each other. My recent work has focused on the context-sensitivity of causal claims, the relation between causation and reasons for action (joint work with Mattias Gunnemyr), and how the distinction between relevant and irrelevant possibilities matters for our attributions of responsibility.
Professor of Philosophy, Aarhus University
Research: My main areas of research include philosophy of mind, philosophy of science (mainly medicine and psychiatry), moral psychology and social philosophy. With respect to responsibility, I am particularly interested in relation between personal autonomy and moral responsibility.
PhD Student in LGRP
Research interests: I am currently interested in the debate between free will skeptics and compatibilists regarding retributive justice. Rather than assuming that one side is completely in the right, I am investigating the possibility that both free will skeptics and compatibilists are making valid claims about moral responsibility that need to be reconciled. In particular, to clarify the issues at stake, I am trying to break down the notion of moral responsibility and its normative dimensions into different moral motives, such as those of seeking fair treatment and demanding retribution. I am furthermore doing research on how these moral motives are played out in moral practices of punishment and especially forgiveness.
Jan Willem Wieland
Assistant Professor, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Research interests: epistemic condition of moral responsibility, kinds of
blameworthiness, strategic ignorance, collective harms, Kantian ethics.